Introduction
This chapter examines the ways in which planning systems across the UK are being systematically reshaped by the twin processes of privatisation and the marketisation of local government finance. It argues that local planning arrangements are being re-fashioned into a growth-led, entrepreneurial mode of governance, designed to maximise financial returns for public and private interests and use planning 'gain' to pay for broader welfare interventions. This systematic entrepreneurialisation of local government means that it no longer fulfils its traditional post-war role of acting as a local provider of national welfare programmes, dependent on the re-distribution of centrally allocated funds (see Cochrane, 1993) . In its place, local authority planners and planning authorities are being converted into spear-heads for a wider governmental programme that prioritises the delivery of growth in the UK's cities and regions. In some instances, as will be discussed below, councils have even become active development agents themselves and established public-private partnerships in an increasingly desperate effort to mitigate the impacts of central government austerity cuts. All of this has taken place in a context of growing social and spatial inequalities, fluctuating and unpredictable welfare demands from increasingly diverse communities, growing pressures on local welfare services 2 brought about by ageing populations, and the constant threat of major governmental shocks, such as the effects of Brexit, de-globalisation, and/or another financial crash (see Dorling, 2014) .
The chapter will show how the entrepreneurialisation of planning has gone hand-in-hand with fundamental changes in the organisation and management of the UK state. Across the world governments have undertaken privatisation programmes since the early 1980s as they wrestle with growing fiscal constraints and increasing welfare demands (see Streeck, 2016) . Across the UK the planning system is increasingly subject to processes of privatisation with private experts becoming active players in the shaping of key policy regulations and outcomes. This, the chapter will argue, has powerful, yet under-researched, implications for understandings of planning practice. Much of the planning literature is still underpinned by assumptions over, for example, the primacy of public planners and/or definitions of a public interest and has been slow to realise just how significant a change is taking place in how local planning governance is operating. As will be shown, it is increasingly difficult to identify what constitutes a 'public' or 'private' actor and the chapter concurs with Moore (2012) The discussion is divided into three sections. The first examines the changing nature of local government finances and the extent of austerity cuts. It argues that a new centralised localism in financial models is being implemented that aims to promote local financial 'self-sufficiency' and the privileging of economic development priorities. The second section examines evidence on the growth of private consultancies and recent changes in the sector. It reviews published information on the 3 scale and character of the consultancy sector and draws on the analysis of company documents and strategies to examine how it is changing in the wake of recent reforms. A final section then interrogates the implications of these trends for the future of planning practices and identifies some of the limitations inherent in recent reforms. It discusses the possibilities for the development of alternative forms of local planning practice and aspects of what this might consist of.
Austerity urbanism and the growth of a New Entrepreneurialism
The effects of the financial crisis of 2008, and the implementation of austerity budgets by successive governments since 2010, have had a major impact on the capacities and structures of the UK's planning systems. Under the Coalition (2010 Coalition ( -2015 and subsequent Conservative administrations (2015-present), a political project of austerity has been rolled out, premised on the assumption that state bureaucracies had become 'too big' and that a new politics of less top-down and centralist statecraft was required. Reform agendas continue fuelled by visions of an on-going economic 'emergency' precipitated by the events of 2008 and the perceived need to use state systems and services to generate, where possible, new sources of finance and income (see Wolin, 2008) . For former Prime Minister David Cameron (2011), this involved "put[ting] in place principles that will signal the decisive end of the old-fashioned, top-down, take what you're given model of public services. And it is a vital part of our mission to dismantle big government" (p.1). In order to achieve this end the government enshrined in law a "a new presumption -backed up by new rights for public service users and a new system of independent adjudication -that public services should be open to a range of providers competing to offer a better service" (p.1).
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The practical implications of this approach have been profound both on local government and the planning system it regulates and oversees. Local authority budgets in England have been cut by £18billion since 2010 with the burden falling disproportionately on areas of greatest social and economic need. As The Economist (2017) local government will retain 100% of taxes raised locally. This will give local government additional business rates receipts of around £12.5bn to spend on local services. The system will have stronger incentives to boost growth, and areas that take bold decisions to boost growth will see the benefits.
The new arrangements form part of a wider set of central government-led reforms in which qualitative modes of practice, such as 'co-operation' and 'partnership-working' have become converted into legalised duties and increasingly quantifiable forms of conduct. The Localism Act 2011, for instance, introduced a new 'legal duty to co-operate…in preparing plans that relate to 'strategic matters'' (Smith, 2016: p.9 ). Built into these Plans are a series of requirements that focus on delivery, planning gain, and the viability and profitability of developments for investors and land owners.
These are encapsulated in Paragraph 173 of the NPPF, a statement that represents one of the most radical reformulations of planning practice since the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947:
pursuing sustainable development requires careful attention to viability and costs in planmaking and decision-taking. Plans should be deliverable. Therefore, the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan should not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that their ability to be developed viably is threatened.
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It goes on to focus on the relationships between the planning system and private developers as, to ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to development, such as requirements for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other requirements should, when taking account of the normal cost of development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable.
Good planning is elided with expedited decision-making that will ensure that 'pre-commencement planning conditions are only imposed by local planning authorities where they are absolutely necessary' (Smith, 2016b: p.11 Obligations to assist the development process" and to actively consider "solutions to reduce costs in order to aid viability…and thinking about the scope for revenues to be increased, for example, by increasing the density of the development" (Scottish Government, 2010:2).
The overall trend is for governments across the UK to apply concerted pressure on local actors to give the go-ahead for developments. In England for instance, local authorities have been incentivised to 7
build new homes with a New Homes Bonus iv . It is a scheme that has faced implementation difficulties and in the latest round of reforms the government makes it clear that from 2018/19 we will consider withholding NHB payments from local authorities that are not planning effectively, by making positive decisions on planning applications and delivering housing growth. To encourage more effective local planning we will also consider withholding payments for homes that are built following an appeal (DCLG, 2016b: 9) . This is backed-up by the implementation of a 'national baseline' target for anticipated growth that local authorities will have to meet, whatever local market conditions, in order to receive future payments. The NHB is one of a number of similar carrot and stick approaches to local government finance that are designed to institutionalise entrepreneurial practices at the local level.
The ethos of the planning system is thus inverted. Its traditional role of ensuring that any new development is only granted permission once it conforms to local, publically-defined needs is replaced by a legal requirement, wherever possible, to prioritise growth and the expansion of new homes and development projects. The role of planning practice is to take the messiness and complexity of places and convert them into spaces ripe for investment. The requirement to become financially self-sufficient will make local authorities increasingly dependent on property market uplift, whatever the wider impacts on marginalised local residents, businesses, and places. As Penny (2017) notes, this is leading to a growing correlation between local government in the UK and the entrepreneurial models of 'localism' and growth that have characterised local governance in the United States since the early 20th Century (see also Peck, 2017) .
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However, despite this push from the centre, there is growing evidence that cuts to planning budgets are reducing the capacities of the planning system to deliver its growth targets, no matter what the demand (see LGiU and FMB, 2016) . Limits on public bureaucracies are being compounded by structural reforms in which local authority services are being compartmentalised and sold off in the name of self-sufficiency. Many local government legal departments, for example, now operate as contracted-out business services to other authorities or private clients, whereas in the past their role was principally to provide advice and guidance to their own authorities (see Dobson, 2014) . Some authorities have even embarked on the setting up of Special Purpose Vehicles and, in some instances, become directly involved in profit-making development projects, in order to generate income (see Penny, 2017) . It is becoming increasingly difficult for many to meet the expected growth in demands for planning services without turning to the capacities found within the private sector.
The combination of these trends is therefore opening up new markets for private actors. As the next section will demonstrate, there is a direct co-evolution between reforms to make the planning system more entrepreneurial and the emergence of an increasingly powerful and influential consultancy sector that is being tasked to 'fill the gap' left in the wake of public sector retrenchment. New mutually reinforcing arrangements are emerging in which private consultancies provide local authorities with the requisite skills and resources to act more entrepreneurially. Forms of interdependency are emerging in which local authorities become increasingly reliant on the presence of private consultancies in order to function and private firms become increasingly reliant on local government restructuring. The result is that private experts have become increasingly involved in the co-regulation of planning policy reforms and in the day-to-day practices associated with the 9 implementation of planning. In the next section the discussion turns to an assessment of key trends in the structure of the planning consultancy sector and its influences.
The Rise and Rise of Planning Consultancies
The The consultancy sector itself is dynamic and undergoing constant reformation. The diverse market opportunities opened up by recent planning reforms have led to a parallel process of consolidation within the sector into bigger companies on the one hand and the simultaneous mushrooming of small firms specialising in specific niche fields of expertise on the other vii (see Table 8 .1). The latter, in turn, are repeatedly acquired by the former who are looking to expand their market strength and their market 'offer' to potential local authority clients. In the period 2006-2015 the multinational Capita, for instance, acquired 130 companies, many of whom specialise in urban planning in different countries, but mainly in the UK. Established, medium-sized specialists are particularly attractive.
One recent high profile purchase took place in 2014 when the biggest UK property market player and planning consultancy Savills acquired Smith Gore Ltd. The latter was an established market player that was founded in 1847 and had 532 staff in 31 UK offices. It was attractive to Savills as it specialised in property development planning in rural locations, a sector that the company saw as an area of potential growth but which lacked the specialist skills offered by Smith Gore (see Savills, 2015) . Similarly, in 2015 the WYG purchased three established firms, FMW consultancy, Taylor
Hardy Ltd., and Signet Planning to create an overall team of 135 experts, making it the 3 rd largest UK player. It has since formed a Major Project Unit in an attempt to bring in-house all of the regulatory requirements that public or private sector clients might require. This is part of a wider trend in which there has been a push towards the creation of multi-disciplinary structures within bigger firms, who are then able to offer public sector clients more 'comprehensive' packages of expertise and knowledge.
[ Table 8 .
1: The 10 Largest UK-based Planning Consultancies]
As with most forms of privatisation, the marketisation of planning has inflated total costs (see Moran, 2015 with the most lucrative opportunities emerging in relation to austerity-hit local government and "the ongoing pressure to reduce budgets while maintaining and adapting frontline services" and "increasingly looking to the private sector to find new service solutions…from traditional outsourcing to transformational partnerships" (p.19).
Other major consultancies such as Barton Willmore (2016) Others such as WYG (2016), whose planning arm made a profit of over £10 million in 2015, similarly highlight that their expansion had been "driven by strong demand for service across buoyant planning and infrastructure markets" and a "strategy of delivering future growth by obtaining quality revenues from front-end planning" (p.7).
The long-term implications of this growing concentration of power in a relatively small number of major consultancies are likely to be profound. Under the NPPF's viability-based arrangements the (substantial) fees and costs associated with privatisation are recovered by developers/investors through higher property values and future market returns. They form an increasingly important component of negotiations over the subsequent use of land and property. As costs inflate, so the ability of local authorities to impose social obligations on developers becomes more and more limited.
There are also spatial implications. Planning practice has traditionally been a local activity, undertaken by local planning authorities who are sensitive to variations in contexts, opportunities, and priorities. However, the market opportunities and returns to be found in bigger cities, with thriving property development programmes, is encouraging private firms to gravitate their focus of attention towards major centres, with less interest in areas in which markets are less lucrative. There is already some evidence of major firms concentrating their activities, and establishing a presence, in major centres of 'opportunity'.
The gradual entrepreneurialisation of planning also has implications for territorial competition and patterns of spatial development. The expansion of private expertise is encouraging a competitive growth politics. In Scotland, for example, the Scottish Property Federation, amongst others, are increasingly drawing on comparative data between different cities and the UK's nations to push for a 13 further stream-lining and speeding up of the planning process 'if we are to attract and retain global capital to support local jobs and investment' (Melhuish, 2016: p.3) . Edinburgh City, in particular, is criticised for its relatively slow approvals process ix . The experiences and conditions found in areas of growth are becoming norms of 'best practice' that influence the activities of planning authorities operating under very different market conditions. As Colenutt et al. (2015) have shown, the standard viability 'bench-mark' for private sector profits used in negotiations is often set at an approximate rate of 20%, a figure based on the specific experiences of escalating property prices in London and the South East. Reliance on external experts and consultants, when allied to central government directives, will inevitably reduce the 'localness' of planning decisions.
The tendency to increase fees in the private sector shows little sign of abating. Firm accounts and statements repeatedly show that skills shortages are now hampering expansion plans and generating a fierce competition for workers that, in turn, is further pushing up labour costs and fees, whilst also encouraging further acquisitions. Moreover, as with any field of private practice, there are also wide variations in the ethical outlooks of market players. Since 2012, a new sector has emerged in which consultancies provide expert help to developers to help them reduce their social obligations.
Companies such as S106- Management (2016) former pub, and planning permission for 10 apartments (only one of which has more than two bedrooms for a family), was on sale for "offers in excess of £1million" (see Caldecott Group, 2016) .
As market opportunities expand, so inevitably will the presence and influence of such firms.
Where Next for Planning Practice?
The programmes. This means that the traditional skills and knowledge(s) that underpinned the practices of post-war planners, such as the ability to negotiate between private and public interests, whilst maintaining a strategic overview of place development, look increasingly out-dated. They still haunt contemporary policy imaginations and discussions over the supposedly 'bureaucratic' nature of planning, but as the chapter has argued these are of less and less significance. In their place the skills to support contemporary planning practices are now to be found in the fields of contract negotiations, the use of good governance templates, the specification of quantifiable inputs and outcomes, and the empowerment of a new generation of technocratic experts. The capacity to negotiate a 'good contract' with a private developer has taken on a new primacy within local authorities, many of whom are now themselves looking for expert help from private consultants.
However, it should also be noted that all models of governance are prone to failures and political challenges. High-profile 'failures' in private provision in sectors such as public transport or the utilities might give a new legitimacy to calls for enhanced public sector control. Some local authorities have also brought in innovative programmes to re-use public assets. In the London boroughs of Islington and Camden planners have introduced new models for the delivery of affordable housing that are more exacting on private developers and make full use of their negotiating powers. On a global scale there exist multiple models of local government practice and financial management that could also be adopted in the UK context. For example, in some parts of Europe and Latin America there have been strong moves towards the 're-municipalisation' of services and infrastructure, particularly in contexts in which private providers are perceived to have 'failed' to maintain or deliver on their contracted obligations (see Hall et al., 2013; Pigeon, 2017) . There are ongoing calls from some for the re-municipalisation of public housing and planning policy in the context of governmental shocks, such as Brexit or a new financial crisis, the conditions within which viability planning currently operates may change significantly, necessitating new policy fixes and imaginations (see Shelter, 2017) .
At the same time the growing inter-dependencies between both local authorities and the consultancy sector presents new risks and vulnerabilities for all parties. A market crash would leave local authorities with under-priced assets and liabilities, exposing them to the risk of bankruptcy (see Wilby, 2017) . The early signs are that new arrangements will entrench existing inequalities between places but this may, in turn, generate political pressure for reform. Resistance to some of the proposed changes is being mobilised by Conservative-controlled local authorities and the Conservative Party-dominated Local Government Association, as well as at the national level by different political parties. There is much scope for the alteration and amendment of current reforms and proposals. The chapter has argued, however, that the co-evolution of planning reforms and a growing consultancy sector is establishing a powerful dynamic that will take significant political will to re-shape in future.
